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Postwar institutions held at bay the  dominance of producer inter-
ests over consumer interests.  But producer pressures toward
protection are now dominant and even with the emergence of
market-opening instruments like "301" the forecast for free
trade is pessimistic:  a buildup of trade restrictions and fewer
breezes to disperse them.
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The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade  Another mutation of GATT institutions has
(GATT) was built on a mercantilist sense of  begun with the development in the United States
economic welfare and a mercantilist sense that  of "301"-  which provides a way for exporting
domestic producers had a higher claim than  producers to advance their interests without
foreign producers to the domestic market.  bearing the burden of suppressing or buying off
import competing interests.  Indeed, "301"
The trade negotiations process did not attack  attacks foreign restrictions not with the possibil-
this claim.  It gave producers in each country an  ity offewer  U.S. restrictions, but with the threat
opportunity to increase its value thLiough  mutu-  of more.  Trade remedy processes have been
ally beneficial exchanges with producers in  installed in many countries, so "301 s" should
other countries.  not be far behind.
The process worked as long as institutions  The GATF svstzm was devised to promote
forced all producers in a country (irmpoxrt  com-  global security and frec trade.  It has been
peting and exporting) to reach a collective  altered until, in the present system, export inter-
decision on trade policy - as long as the trade  csts wvill  generate trade conflicts and import
remedies were subjugated by strategic and  competing interests will generate trade restric-
diplomatic concems so that they did not give  tions.
import competing interests an alternative.
Simply put, the institutions that shape the
Pressure from import competing producers,  relevant public choices do not bring out the
whose interests are netted out in the trade nego-  appropriate economic interests, and the resulting
tiations process, eventually expanded the trade  policy choices are not those that promote
rcmedies into a polic)making  institution !hat  economic ef.icicncy.
now eclipses the trade negotiations.
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A  PUBLIC CHOICE APPROACH
J.M. Finger
Institutions do matter --  over the long
run perhaps far more thar the adoption of
this  or  that  policy  option  or  the
election  of this  or that politician  or
party.
(Buchanan 1984, p. 5)
Reciprocal  reductions  of tariffs have been  one  of  the  success
stories  of  post-World  War  II  international cooperation.  Through  these
reductions,  negotiated  since  1947  at  a  series  of  multilateral  GATT
"rounds," industrial country  tariffs on manufactured  goods which  ranged
from 30 percent to 60 percent have been reduced to an average  o-  4  Fprc-nr
to 8  peicent.  Parallel negotiations, in a different forum, restored the
convertability  of  currencies  and  eliminated  most  of  the  quantitative
restrictions  in place  in the  industrial countries at the  end  of WWII.
Together, these changes created a truly open international trading system
among the major trading nations.
Yet  there  is  increasing  concern  that  the  opern  international
trading system is being seriously eroded.  Even while the tariff cuts were
being  agreed  and  implemented,  voluntary  export  restraints,  grey  area
measures, and other questionable trade practices began to appear, and to
close down the trading system.  Free trade is advancing, it seems, at the
same time as protection is becoming more frequent.
As this essay will demonstrate, public choice theory provides the
keys to understanding this apparent incongruity.  The first key is to notethat the institutions through which tariff decisions are made within  the
post-WWII GATT system are dirffrent from those through which decisions on
other forms  of trade restrictions are made.  A..d,  as James M.  Buchanan
reminds us in the sentence quoted above, institutions do matter, so much
so, this paper will explain, that one institutional process can be moving
the  trading  system  toward  free  trade  while  another  moves  it  toward
protection.
But  institutions are not  immutable.  Interests, over  time, can
reshape them.  Post WWII  institutions for a whf e held at bay and  even
rolled  back  the  dominance  of concentrated producer  interests ove'.  more
dispersed consumer interests.  But, this paper will argue, tha shoe is on
the other foot now.  The processes that create trade restrictions are now
dominant,  and  the  forecast  for  the  international  trading  system  is
pessimistic:  continuing buildup of trade restrictions anA  onnt4"i4
diminution of the breezes that disperse them.
I.  THE LOGIC OF NEGOTIATED REDUCTIONS
Each country has the sovereign right to regulate its imports, and
most  tend to  overdo  it.  This matter  is well  understood.  When  import
restrictions are decided unilaterally, producer interests (the benefits of
protection) are more effectively represented in the policy decision process
than consumer interests (the costs of protection) and the overall national
economic  interest  is not  well  served.  When  import  restrictions  are
determined through a process of negotiation with one's trading partners, an
additional  interest  group  is  made  effective.  Determining  trade
restrictions on a reciprocal basis ties together (a) the access a country
allows foreign suppliers to its domestic market, and  (b) the access the- 3 -
country's exporters will have to foreign markets.  This link brings
exporters' interests to bear on the import  restrictions,  and the bias
toward  protection  will be less. 1/ As to the legal technicalities,  each
participating  country  agrees  through  the  GATT to allow  other  participants
access to its market at least as  favorable  as the tariff  schedule  it
annexed  to the agreement. When agreement  involves  reductions  of tariffs,
the new rates are "annexed"  in such schedules. Each country's  schedule,
the  parties  agree,  is  subject  to  moat-favored-nntion  (MFN)  treatment  within
the  group.
The US reciprocal trade agreements  program  and the adaptation
through  the GATT  of the same  process  on a multilateral  basis  are familiar
examples. An equally  appropriate,  though  perhaps  less familiar  example  is
provided  by Jan  Tumlir  (1985). Before  the  first  World  War,  European  states
maintained  among  themselves  a system  of bilateral  commercial  treaties  in
which tariffs  werr contractually  bound  for  lorn-  ;  riods, usually  10  years.
The treaties  were tied to each other  by the inc  lusion  of an unconditional
most favored  nation  (MFN)  clause  in each.  As in the later  "GATT  system,"
national  legislatures  tended  to delegate  the  power  to negotiate  tariffs  to
the executive.  Within this institutional  structure,  the participating
countries  were able  to  maintain  an  open  trading  system. The  system's  legal
structure  was a series  of bilateral  treaties  of friendship,  commerce  and
navigation,  linked  together  by including  the MFN clause  in each --  quite
different  from the  multilateral  agreement  that is the legal  structure  of
the GATT.  However,  the  public  choice  structures  of the  two  were similar,
l/  For  lengthier  expositions  see  Hauser  (1986),  Roessler  (1986),  and  Moser
(1988).- 4 -
as were the successes of thb two systems to generatw  an open trading
system.
Ii.  THE  LOGIC  OF TRADE  REMEDIES
While  the  first  functional  part  of w'e  GATT  prcvides  the  mechanics
tnrough  which  countries  exchange  access  to each  other's  markets,  the  second
functional  part defined  the circumstances  under  which a country  might go
back on  such an exchange.  It apecifies when a  country may  impose
restrictions  to  safeguard  the balance  of paymer.ts,  may  introduce
antidumping ar.d  countervailing dutiee, etc.  The  inclusion of such
provisions  for  trade  restrictions  in an agresment  i 4atended  to promote  free
trade  can  be explained  in two  ways.  First,  including  them in  the  GATT  was
part of the price national governments paid  their import compet  ng
interests  not to block  the  country's  participation  in the  negotiations  to
reduce tariffs.  Second, specifying the circumstances  under which a
government  can  restrict  imports  may  help the  government  to resist  pre66-ires
to do so in  other  circumstances.
Wii.hin  a property rights conception,  the GATT is a contract
through  which a nation  exchanges  access  to its  domestic  market  for  access
to the domestic  markets of the other  nations.  This exchange  of market
acces- is subject to extensive and  specific reservations  as to the
circumstances  und'r  which and the procedures  through  which a country  may
reduce  this  access,  i.e.,  impose  import  restrictions.  However,  which  GATT
provisions advance the agreement's objective and which  provide for
exceptions  depends  on  where  one's  interests  lie. The  GATT,  when read  by an
ir  jrt competing  enterprise,  becomes  a statement  of the circumstances  in
and procedures  by which a nation  may impose  import  restrictions,  subjecthowever to the reservations  the nation has placed upon itself in the
granting  of P.ccess  to foreigners.  The trade  policy  of one of the  more
protectionist .andie2tes  for his party's  1984 US oresidential  nomiration
was summed  up in the slogan,  "The GATT permits  such actions  --  and it's
time  we took  them."
Taken a ste- further,  into national  laws and regulations  which
provide actual legal substance  to a  protectionist perspective  on this
contract, the circumstances under which a country may impose import
restrictions  become  the rights  of particular  interests  within  the country
to  protection  from  import  competition.
The  mechanics  of these  provisions  is  easier  to  explain  in concreLe
terms  than  in generalities,  so I  will use the  United  States  an an example.
Current  US law  provides  six  tracks  to  which  a domestic  firm  or industry  may
patiti-~Z-.  tha  US  for=-  -- 1-  '-..  Cz-Iz  £.--  J._--,  -*.-f  fJ
protection. These  are:
(1)  Escape  clause  or safeguards  ("201"  cases);
(2)  Antidumping;
(3)  Antisubsidy  or countervailing  duty;
(4)  Unfair  trade  practices  actions  ("301"  cases);
(5)  Unfair  import  practices  ("337"  cases);
(6)  Market  disruption  ("406"  cases).
The centerpiece  of an escape clause or safeguards  case is an
investigation  by the International  Trade Commission  of injury to a US
industry  resulting  from  increased  imports. An investigation  begins  when an
industry  "petitions"  the  ITC  for  "import relief.'  If  the injury
determination  is  affirmative,  the  ITC  recommends  a remedy  to the  President.
This remedy might be imposition  of tariffs,  imposition  of quantitative- 6 -
restrictions  or other forms  of import  controls  or it might be  adjustment
MMs4  stance without the  imposition of any border measure to rest.ict
imports. US law  does  not  however  requie the  Presidert  to follow  t'Le  ITC's
recommendation,  but  if the  President  chooses  not  to implement  import  relief
when the ITC has so recommended  or to implement  a form of import  relief
different  from that recommended  by the ITC, hi. decision  is subject  to
Congressional  override.
The  escape  clause  does  not  raise  questions  about  the  "fairness"  of
imports,  but  other  trade  remedy  tyacks  do.  Antidumping  peLitions  are filed
simultaneously  with  the  ITC  and  with  the  International  Trade
Administrations  (ITA)  of the  Department  of Commerce. An antidumping  case
entails two separate investigations:  a material injury investigation
(conducted  by the ITC)  and  a sales  at "less  than  fair  value"  investigation
(conducted  bv the  ITAI.  If  both  mater4.l  4-njntly  VtA  -tles  at lees then
fair  value are found  to exist,  the  Department  of Commerce  is required  by
law  to issue  an antidumping  order. An antidumping  order  means that  unless
the  exporter  raises  his  price  accordingly  he  must pay  an antidumping  duty.
Most choose  to raise their  price.  The antidumping  law provides  specific
opportunities  for an agreement to be reached between the petitioning
domestic  party  and the foreign  party to terminate  the case.  Grounds  for
such agreed  termination  are almost  always  an enforceable  and monitorable
commitment  by the  foreign  seller  to  eliminate  the  dumping  practice,  usually
by raising  the  price  he charges  in  the  US market.
Countervailing  duty cases, like dumping  cases,  are carried  out
under  the  authority  of the  Department  of Commerce,  the  ITA.  Cases  involve
an investigation  of subsidy  conducted  by the  'TA,  and  in  most instances,  an
injury investigation  conducted by the ITC.  Injury investigations  arecarried  out in all cases concerning  duty froe goods and in those cases
involving signatories to tka CATT-subsidies  code, against Taiwan and
against  all  countries  to  whom the  US has  extended  by treaty,  unconditional
moat-favored-nation  status.  As with antidumping  law, the countervailing
duty  law  provides  opportunities  for  a case  to be terminated  upon  agreement
between the petitioning  party and exporter.  Again, such agreement  is
conditioned  upon an enforceable  and monitorable  co-itment by the foreign
party  to  eliminate  the  subsidy  practice.
"Section  301"  follows  a similar  petition-investigation  format,  but
is an outlet  mainly  for complaints  by US elRorters  of unfair  treatment  in
foreign  markets.  It will be discussed  below.  Section  406 provides  an
easier safegaards  procedure  that may be used only against imports  from
communist  countries. "337" cases  are  mainly  about  patent  infringement.
In recent years, these trade remedies  have eclipsed  the traAe
negotiations  process  and  have  come  to dominate  trade  policy. Again,  the  US
case being the archetype  example  of GATT-consistent  institutions,  is the
easiest to document.  In the 1950s  and 1960.,  US crade  legislation  was
mostly  about  granting  the  President authority to negotiate tariff
reductions. But  over  time,  a larger  and larger  share  of trade  legislation
has  dealt with  the  expansion and strengthening of trade  remedies,
particulariy  those  that  appear  to  correct  dunfair"  foreign  trade  practices.
For example,  the widely circulated  and frequantly  praised  US Chamber  of
Commerce  explanation  of the 1988 US trade bill de.  otes 16 pages to the
import  relief  clauses  and  6  pages  to "301." "Negotiating  authority"  gets  2
pages,  the same number  as "Adjustment  Assistance"  for  which the Congress
has  provided  no funding.-8-
,'Unfair"  forstign  practices provide the  screen  behind which a
government  can  enjoy  being  seduced  by special 'interests  and  yet  pretend  to
act nobly.  U.S. Treasury  Secretary  James  A. Baker  III, in defenelng  the
Reagan Administration's  trade policy,  pointed  out in 1987 "We have not
neglected  our responsibilities  to fair trade. ...  President  Reagan, in
fact, has granted more import relief to US industry than any of his
predecessors  in more than  half a century."  n/  Half a century  covers  every
president  since  Herbert  Hoover,  the  president  who signed  the  Smoot-Hawley
tariff.
Table  1  tabulates  1980-1986  trade  remedies  cases  in countries  that
are the  major users of such GATT-formal  mechanisms.  Of a total  of 2024
cases,  only 45 were safegaurds  cases,  i.e.,  only 45  did not accuse  the
foreign  party  of  unfairness.  3/
From a  public choice  perspective,  the intriguing  matter is not
that the special-interest  arming  trade  remedies  have come to dominate  the
trade  negotiations. The intriguing  question  is why it took so long.  How
did the liberalizing  trade  negotiations  dominate  trade  policy  from  the  end
of  WWII perhaps  through  most of  the 1970s?
2/  Baker,  p. 4.
3/  Unfairness provides the political rhetoric and the administrative
process through  which an interest  group presents  i  case, but the
unfair  trade  procedures  do  not  always  provide  the  form  of the  resulting
trade  restriction. Finger  and  Murray  (1989)  documunt  that almost  half
of  US antidumping  and  countervailing  duty  cases  end  up with  negotiated
export  restraints.Table  1:  UMSP  OF  ADNINISTERED  *ROIECTION  CASKS,  1980-86
1980-
1980  1981  t982  1963  1984  1985  1986  1986
Safeguards
Unitad  States  2  6  4  2  6  3  5  28
Australia  1  0  1  2  0  0  0  4
Canada  0  1  2  0  0  1  0  4
EC  3  1  1  1  1  0  2  9
Countervailing  actions
United  States  8  10  123  21  51  39  30  282
Australia  0  0  2  7  S  3  3  21
Canada  3  0  1  3  2  3  4  16
EC  0  1  3  2  1  0  0  7
Antidumping  actions
Unltad  St_tea  22  14  61  47  71  65  71  351
at  r  C_  7  i a.....  C-s  ?a  I7  --  n  R  4C6
Canada  25  19  72  36  31  36  74  293
EC  25  47  55  36  49  42  40  294
Other  unfair  trade
practices  - US  28  19  73  39  33  39  28  259
All  Categories
Un..ed  States  60  49  261  109  161  146  13'.  920
Australia  63  50  81  96  62  63  66  481
Canada  28  2G  75  39  33  4.0  78  313
EC  28  49  59  39  51  42  42  310
Total  179  168  476  283  307  291  320  2024
Sources: United  States  data,  US International  Trade  Comission,  ]LLAD-C.SIS  Database;
Other  Countries,  Finger  and  Olechowiski  (1987)  - Tables  A8.1,  A8.3,  for
numbers  of  antidumping  and  countervailing  duty  cases;  CATT  Secretariat,
for  numbers  of  safeguards  cases.- 10  -
An obvious possibility --  that th. trade remedies processes did not exist
unt 4l recently  --  turns out not to be true.  Provisions  for safeguards,
antidumping  and  countervailing  duties  are in the  GATT  because  they  existed
in national legislation when  the GATT was  negotiated, and national
governments  would  not  give  them  up.
Part  of  tne  answer  to  why the  trade  remedies  did  not  generate  many
trade  restrictions  was that  the  people  who made up the  government  did  not
want them to.  To many of them, trade policy  was less economics  than
international  diplomacy  and the idea was widely shared that freedom  of
commerce  could  be an importa.Lt  instrument  for  maintaining  world  peace.  To
Cordell  Hull,  Secretary  of State  for President  Franklin  D. Roosevelt,  the
link was straightforwaru  "[U]n'.ampered  trade dovetailed  with peace;  high
tariffs,  trade  barriers  and unfair  economic  competition  with war." 4/ The
Cold  War  with  Russia  allowed  a  vulgar  version  of this  idea  to generate  wide
public  support  for  the  government's  trade  policy: If the  United  States  did
not provide  markets  for these  countries  they would be taken  over by the
Communist  Bloc.
And in I.M. Destler's informative  phrase, the trade remedies
provided  "protection  for  Congress"  against  tho  wrath of special  interests
that  would  press  a  Congressman  who  was sympathetic  to the  general  thrust  of
US trade policy.  The ideology  of interdependence  to preserve global
stability  was part  of it,  but  not  all  of it.  Economics  did  matter,  but  not
in the way an economist  would explain  the "gains  from trada."  In this
regard  the old metaphor  about  prosperity  is informative: a rising  tide
4/  Quoted  by Cooper,  p. 299,  from  Cordell  Hull's  Memoirs. Cooper  provides
similar quotes from Presidents  Franklin D. Roosevelt  and Harry S.
Truman.- 11  -
lifts  all boats.  The 1950.  and 1960.  were generally  prosperous  times  in
which  the US enjoyed substantial trade surpluses.  5/  Directing a
protection-seeking  industry  into  a  maze of administrative  procedures  bought
time,  and  before  the  industry  came  to realize  there  was  no prize  at the  end
of the  maze it realized  that  business  was better,  and  pressed  the  case  no
further.  Besides,  the system  satisfied  the American  sense of fairness.
There  was a place  to complain,  they  listened,  they  investigated,  they  held
hearings.  One had one's  day in court.  To complain  further  would be un-
American,  maybe  even  pro-Communist,  if the  closing  of the  US market  tipped
a  country  over to the Russian  side in the Cold War.  In sum, the trade
remedies  procedures  could  be calibrated  to produce  trade  restrictions  at a
much  lower  rate  than  the  trade  negotiations  were removing  them.
Import  Politics
But things  would  not stay  that  way forever. Consider  one of E.E.
Schattechneider's  observations  about the pressure  group politics  of the
1930 tariff:  "A policy that is so hospitable and catholic as the
protective  tariff  disorganizes  its opposition.  (p.  88)  The same would
turn  out to be true  for  the trade  remedies. Yearly,  the  political  motives
for  the  trade  liberalization  program  waned,  and  the  capacity  of the  rest  of
the  world  to  export  to the  United  States  increased. It is  hard  to remember
American  idealism  after  WWII to  build  a better  world,  also  hard  to remember
5/  There has been a considerable  amount of research  on how aggregate
economic  conditions  affect  pressures  for  protection. Coughlin,  et al,
Feigenbaum,  Ortiz  and  Willett  and  Takacs  are  good  examples  that  provide
additional  references.- 12 -
that forty years ago everyone knew that the LDCs would never export
manufactured  goods.  To reverse  the  thrust  of US trade  policy  it was  not
necessary  to create  a new  mechanism,  only  to recalibrate  the  trade  remedies
process  so that  it  provides  more import  relief. And  year  by  year the  trade
remedies  process  expandeds
(1)  Technical changes expanded definitions  of "injury,"
"dumping,"  etc. i.e., expanded the specification  of
when an industry  had  a right  to "import  relief."
(2)  Loopholes  were closed,  loopholes  that  the  President  had
exploited  to set  aside  determinations  that  an industry
was  eligible  for  import  relief.
(3)  Judicial  review  was imposed,  to force  administration  of
the trade remedy  laws toward  what Congress  intended,
away  from  the loopholes  the  President  tried  to find  to
allow  him  to  meet  his  international  obligations  to  keep
the  US  market  open  to import  competition.  6/
The unfair trade laws in the judgment  of two of Washington's  top trade
lawyers  are  now "the  usual  first  choice  for industries  seeking  protection
from imports  intc  the  United  States."  7/ They have  been  made broad enough
that  they  can  now  give  expression  to almost  every  pressure  for  protection.  8/
6/  Details  of  these  changes  are  provided  by Finger  (1990).
7/  Horlick  and  Oliver,  p. 5.
8/  This  brings  to mind another  lesson  that  E.E.  Schattschneider  drew from
the  politics  of the Smoot-Hawley  tariff: "One  of the  great  defects  of
the protective  system  is that  it provides  no  clear basis  for
discrimination,  and  that,  since  discrimination  is politically
difficult,  Congress  destroys  the  essential  character  of the policy  in
order  to  make it  politically  strong."  (p.  85)- 13 -
Is export  golitics  really  dead?
But  the  trade  negotiations  are  still  around,  are  they  not?  Do not
the trade negotiations still provide the mechanics through which the
politics  of  export  expansion will  dominate the politics of  import
restrictions?
The answer is "No."  U.S. exporters  no longer  need the trade
negotiations  to advance  their  interests.  They  have  "301."
Section  301  was added  to the list of trade  remedies  by the 1974
trade  bill  and  has  been  modified  and  extended  by the 1979,  1984,  1989  trade
bills. It authorizes  the  US Trade  Representative  9/ to take  action  against
foreign  trade  practices  that  violate  international  agreements  or burden  or
otherwise restrict US commerce in an unreasonable or discriminatory
fashion.  The  instrument explicitly covers services, investment  and
intellectual  property.
"301"  deals  with two categories  of practices:  (a)  violations  of
US rights under a  trade agreement, and  (b) otherwise unjustifiable,
unreasonable  or discriminatory  action  or policy  that  burdens  or restricts
US commerce. When the  GATT is  the  agreement  that  the  petitioner  alleges  is
violated,  the  US Trade  Representative  is required  to submit  the  matter  to
the GATT dispute settlement  process simultaneous  with his investigation
under "301."  If the US Trade Representative  determines  that a foreign
violation  of a trade  agreement  (category  "a,"  above)  does exist  the  Trade
9/  Until  the  1988  amendments  "301"  authority  was given  to the  President.- 14 -
Representntive  must retaliate.  10/  But,  the  section  also  allows  the  USTR to
waive retaliation  if the GATT dispute  settlement  process  decides  against
the  United  States,  the  foreign  government  takes  action  to remove  or offset
the  violation,  or if retaliation  would "backfire"  or significantly  harm  US
commercial  interests  or  US  national  security.  The  law  defines
"unreasonable"  as  an act,  policy  or practice  that  is unfair  and
inequitable,  though not necessarily  a violation of explicit US legal
rights. When the  US Trade  Representative  finds  actions  or  policies  of this
sort,  she  has  the  authority  to retaliate,  but is  not  required  to  do so.
The intent,  and to a large  extent  the use of "301"  has been to
advance  the  interests  of US exporters. Of forty-seven  cases  that  had come
to conclusion  by  December  31,  1988, twenty-seven  ended with some
liberalization  of a foreign  restriction,  one  with a liberalization  by the
United  States,  eleven  ended  when USTR found  that the foreign  practice  was
legitimate or did not  burden US commerce and 8  ended with a  trade
restricting  action  by the  United  States.  11/
The  menace  of "301"  is  not that  it serves  US export  interests  but
that it unchains  them from the necessity  to oppose  US import  competing
interests. It arms the  US negotiator  not  with the authority  to remove  US
import  restrictions,  but  with the threat  to impose  new ones.  It provides
the domestic political  mechanics  to press for export expansion  without
paying  the  price  of removing  US import  restrictions.
10/  Since 1988,  retaliation  may not be on the case's  subject  product  or
service,  e.g., if the subject  practice  affects US exports  of rice,
retaliation  cannot  be a restriction  on  US imports  of rice.
11/  The numbers in this paragraph are from the author's  tabulation  of
information  given in US International  Trade Cominvsion,  Oieration  of
the  Trade  Agreements  Proaram,  1975  through  1988  editions.- 15 -
The basic  public  choice  mechanics  of the trade  negotiations  have
been  undone.  Export  interests  no longer  have to find the  courage  and  the
organization  to overcome import-competing  interests.  The two interest
groups  can  view  the  trade  negotiations  in the  same manner.  The
multilateral  negotiations,  like the drafting  of a US trade bill, can be
mostly a matter of searching  for  words to express  a common  standard  of
"fairness." What policies  this standard  in fact allows  and disallows  is
left  to be  worked  out  in  the  bilateral  disputes  brought  forward  under  "301"
and  other  countries'  equivalent  instruments.  The  multilateral
negotiations  used  to  be a counter  to  the  domestic  politics  of trade  policy.
Now they  are  an extension  of it.
III. THE  CODES  APPROACH
By the middle 1960s, new trade restrictions  were appearing  in
noticeable  regularity.  Most of the  industrial  countries  had  begun  to limit
textile imports and Japan, in acceding  to the GATT, had been asked to
restrain  its exports  of several  products. Though  many believed  that the
most effective  way to retard  the spread  of new trade  restrictions  was to
proceed  with negotiations  to reduce  tariffs  --  the  "bicycle  theory,"  it  was
sometimes  called  --  there  was a growing  feeling  that  the  trend  of  nontariff
barriers  (NTBs) was  shaking itself loose from the momentum of the
negotiations  to reduce  tariffs,  and some  attempts  at agreement  to control
NTBs  were  made at the 1960's  Kennedy  Round.  Even  though  the  Kennedy  Round
achieved broader and deeper  tariff  cuts than any other round,  the NTB
negotiations  met  with little  success.
The international  community  then  made NTBs the major concern  of
the 1974-79  Tokyo  Round.  There,  agreement  was reached  on six  NTB "codes,"- 16 -
the  major  of which  were the subsidies,  countervailing-duties  code and the
antidumping code.  The  codes are elaborations of  the initial GATT
specifications  thiit  were intended  to limit  when and how a country  could
impose  an import  restriction. The logic  here,  as in the  original  GATT,  is
that if the circumstances  under which a country may impede trade are
specified, the  frequency with which  it does so will  be less.  The
formulators  of this approach  hoped that codification  would make national
procedures to impose trade restrictions  the sa-a in one country  as in
another,  and that as precedents  built up each national  government  would
have effective  means for handling  pressures  for protection. Petitioners
would be assured  that their cases  were decided  on the same grounds  as
anyone  else's (and that these  grounds  were the right grounds)  and would
thus  be  brought  toward  accepting  a  possibly  negative  decision.
As to effects,  all  reviewers  agree  that  the  subsidies  code  had  had
little  effect,  either  on the  extent  of subsidization  or on the propensity
of importing  countries  to take  countervailing  actions.  12/  The antidumping
code earns lower  marks.  The number  of cases  by code signatories  --  1288
over the seven  years 1980-86,  more than half of which led to antidumping
duties or a restrictive  consent  arrangement  --  is alarming.  Even more
alarming  is the considerable  progress  the code has made to promote  the
acceptance  by one country  of another's  trade  restricting  actions  --  as if
the  objective  were to bring  order  and agreement  to the  procebs  of closing
down  the  international  trading  system  rather  than  to  keep it  open.
It is not hard to explain  why the codes  have not retarded  the
spread  of trade restrictions. First,  the codes  provide  a more elaborate
'<lQ-  r. an.d  .-- O.-  (10n87..- 17 -
specification  of the  circumstances  under  which  a country  could  impose  trade
restrictions. But the  specification  of these  circumstances,  while legally
complex,  incorporates  a  very narrow  economic  perspective  --  the  effects  of
imports  on competing  domestic  producers. The institutional  structure  gives
voice to no countervailing  economic  interests,  and the  more elaborate  the
institutional structure becomes the harder it is for countervailing
interests  to  make their  voices  heard.
A related  matter: while  the  intent  of the  codes  drafters  may have
been to reduce the degree of ambiguity over what "dumping"  and other
operative  terms meant, it seems instead  to have submerged  an unchanged
degree  of ambiguity  to a  much  more technical  level. William  B. Carmichael,
drawing  on twelve  years'  experience  as head of the Australian  Industries
Assistance  Commission,  concluded  that "the processes  to be followed  in
antidumping  investigations  are not amenable to precise and consistent
application. This  means  that  the  task  of administering  the  legislation  is
not simply  a task  of following  a set  of unambiguous  rules.  To determine,
for  example,  which  good sold  in the  home  market  is like  the  good sold  for
export involves judgment  and discretion  about  which technical  rules to
apply. That  determination  also  demands  expertise  in  the  application  of the
technical  procedures."  (1986,  p.  2).
It now requires  more, and more expensive  legal,  accounting,  and
economic  skills  to get to the level at which there is ambiguity,  i.e.,
discretion,  to be exploited.  In short,  more elaborate  procedures  make
collective  action  even  more expensive  and thus tips  the "concentrated  vs.
dispersed"  dimension  of the  matter  even  further  toward  the  more
concentrated  interests,  the producer  interests. Finally,  the creation  of
more elaborate and more legalistic  processes tends to legitimize the- 18  -
resulting  restrictinn  --  in  effect,  to  misuse  the  public's  respect  for  due
process.
IV  VOLUNTARY  EXPORT  RESTRAINTS
When  one  recognizes  which  economic  interests  are given  voice and
what  property  rights  are  recognized  and  given  exchange  value  in  the  GATT,
it  is  easy  to  understand  why  the  negctiated,  or  voluntary  export  restraint
has  become  a  popular  form  of  trade  restriction.  While  legally  speaking,
the  GATT consistency  of  a  VER is  questionable,  a  VER  is,  from  a  public
choice  perspective,  the  ultimate  or  archetype  GATT solution  to  a  trade
dispute.
First,  a  VER  displays  the  involved  parties'  respect  for  the
mercantilist  sense  of property rights the GATT negotiating  procedure
recognizes  and  reinforces.  The  country  wanting  to withdraw  access  it has
previously  traded  away  negotiates  to do so,  and  pays  for it through  higher
price  of  imports generated by the  restricted supply.  Within  this
mercantilist  sense  of economic  welfare,  of each nation's  property  and of
what has been exchanged, a VER is the least cost solution for each
government  --  certainly  less costly  than the compensation  or retaliation
that  the  letter  of the  GATT suggests. If  say,  the  US "paid  for"  new limits
on  imports  of Japanese  autos  by  liberalizing imports of Japanese
electronics,  the US economy  would bear the adjustment  cost of a shift  of
resources  from electronics  to autos,  and the  US government  would have the
political  problem  of explaining  why the  US electronics  industry  has to  pay
for  the  protection  given  to autos.  The  Japanese  economy  is in the  mirror-
image situation  --  resources  would have to move fr.m the autos to the
electronics  industry. If the US refused  to provide  compensation  and the- 19  -
Japanese  government  retaliated  against  imports  of US beef, the situation
would be similar.  So long as the institutional  structure "sells" a
mercantilist  conception  of  costs  and  benefits,  a  VER,  providing
compensation  through  higher  auto  prices,  avoids  the  political  and  economic
problems  that  would  occur  if the  "injury"  ware borne  by one sector  and  the
"compensation"  received  by another.
GATT's  "enforcement"  provisions  reinforce  this  mercantilist  sense
of national  property  rights.  First  of all, the power  the GATT has been
given  to enforce  its  rules  is quite  different  from  the  way one  would  think
of  enforcement  in the  context  of  a penal  code  and  a  police  force. There  is
no police  force.  Rather,  there is a "dispute  settlement"  process,  whose
power  over national  trade  policies  is limited  to the  power  of persuasion,
armed  by appeal  to an agreed  international  standard. Consistent  with the
absence of police powers, the thrust of the GATT's dispute settlement
procedure  is toward  helping  and encouraging  the disputing  parties  to work
things  out.  Robert  Hudec,  a leading  expert  on GATT dispute  settlement,
puts  it this  way, "The  first  principle  of GATT  dispute  settlement  theory  is
that  a  negotiated  solution  is  the  best solution."  13/
The  procedures  themselves  are  proof  that  Hudec's  interpretation  is
correct.  Under GATT's  procedures,  the government  of a country  that felt
its "benetits"  under  the  GATT  were being  "nullified  or impaired"  by say,  a
United States action, must begin by asking for consultations  with the
United States, and the United States is obligated to enter into such
consultations.  The complaining  country, the plaintiff,  may refer the
matter  to the  CONTRACTING  PARTIES  i.e.,  the  entire  GATT  membership,  after
13/  Hudec  1978,  p. 6.- 20 -
one round of consultation,  but normal  practice  is for several  rounds  of
consultation, sometimes with  additional countries participating, and
frequently  with the  informal  assistance  or good  offices  of the  GATT  staff.
If an acceptable  solution  does not result,  the  complaining  party
may notify the CONTRACTING  PARTIES  that it wishes them to take up the
matter.  The GATT  membership,  called  the GATT "Council"  when they  meet to
conduct  GATT affairs,  then  appoints  a "panel"  to look  into tho  matter. A
panel includes  three to five individuals,  but no nationals  of countries
party  to the  dispute.
The  panel  reviews  written  submissions  from  the disputant  partiee,
listens to their oral arguments --  generally speaking, does what is
necessary  to understand  the case and to prepare  its report.  This report
presents  the facts of the matter  as the panel has determined  them, the
panel's  findings  and conclusions  on how GATT rights  and obligations  have
been affected, and its recommendations  for appropriate  actions  by the
parties  to the dispute.  But the panel's  process is as important  as its
report,  and the process is arranged  to promote  an agreed  outcome.  The
panel  is  required  to  consult  regularly  with the  disputants  and  to give  them
the opportunity  to develop a mutually satisfactory  solution.  In this
spirit,  the panel's  final  report  is  delivered  first  to the  parties  to the
dispute. One to two  months  later,  if the dispute  has  not been  withdrawn,
the  panel  report  is submitted  to the  CONTRACTING  PARTIES  and  placed  on the
Council  agenda  for discussion. Consensus  voting  is the  normal  procedure,
hence the report  is not considered  adopted  if any country  objects  to its
acceptance.
If the panel's  report  is adopted  but its recommendations  are  not
implemented  within  a reasonable  period  of time,  the plaintiff  may ask the- 21 -
CONTRACTING PARTIES to help to find an appropriate solution.  Under the
GATT  the  CONTRACTING  PARTIES ultimately can  authorize the plaintiff  to
retaliate against the defendant's action.  But only once, in 1952,  has the
dispute settlement procedure gone to that point.  14/ As  GATT's drafters
intended, a deal of some sort is almost always  worked out.
V.  CONCLUSIONS
The GATT was built on a  mercantilist sense of economic welfare and
a mercantilist  sense  that  domestic  producers  had  a  higher  claim  than
foreign producers to the domestic market.  The trade negotiations process
did  not  attack  this  claim  --  it  gave  producers  in  each  country  an
opportunity  to  increase its value  through mutually  beneficial exchanges
with producers in other countries.
The process worked as long as institutions forced all producers in
a country (import competing and exporting) to reach a collective decision
on  trade  policy  --  as  long  as  the  trade  remedies  were  subjugated  bv
strategic  and  diplomatic  concerns  so  that they did  not provide  import
competing interests an alternative.
Pressure  from  import  competing  producers,  whose  interests are
netted out in the trade negotiations process, eventually expanded the trade
remedies  into  a  policymaking  institution  that  now  eclipses  the  trade
negotiations.  Another mutation of GATT institutions has begun with  the
development  in  the  United  States  of  "301."  "301" provides a way  for
exporting producers to advance their interests  without bearing the burden
of suppressing or buying off import competing interests.  "301" attacks
14/ ?lank 1987, p. 92.- 22 -
foreign  restrictions  not  with the  possibility  of fer2 US restrictions,  but
with the threat  of more.  Trade  remedies  procosses  have been installed  in
many  countries,  "301s"  should  not  be far  behind.
The GATT system  was devised  to promote  global  security  and free
trade.  It has  been  altered  until,  in  the  present  system,  export  interests
will generate  trade  conflicts  and import  competing  interests  will generate
trade  restrictions. Simpl'  put, the institutions  that shape  the relevant
public  choices  do not  bring  out  the  appropriate  economic  interests,  and  the
resulting  policy  choices  are not those  that promote  economic  efficiency.
To a reader  familiar  with economic  history,  this  should  not  be a surprise.
Institutions  do not always  get the underlying  interests  right --  or as
Douglas  North  might  put  it,  not  even  often. "The  fact  that  growth  has  been
more exceptional  than stagnation  or decline suggests that 'efficient'
property  rights  are  unusual  in  history."  (North,  p. 6)- 23  -
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